Adult Punishment for Juvenile Offenders: Does It Reduce Crime? by Redding, Richard E.
Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Year 2006
Adult Punishment for Juvenile
Offenders: Does It Reduce Crime?
Richard E. Redding
Villanova University School of Law, redding@chapman.edu
This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art47
V. CHAPTER 19
ADULT PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: DOES IT REDUCE CRIME?
Richard E. Redding, J.D., Ph. D.
The decade prior to 1994 saw a significant increase in violent juvenile crime, high profile 
cases of serious and violent crimes committed by juveniles and young adults, and the resulting 
perception that America was experiencing a juvenile crime wave unlike anything in its history 
(see Zimring, 1998). Based on the projected growth in the juvenile population during the early 
twenty-first century, some predicted a coming storm of youth violence (see Welch, Fenwick, & 
Roberts, 1997) and the emergence of young Asuper-predators@ (DiIulio, 1995).
The public, and perhaps even more so policymakers, demanded action. There was a rough 
consensus among legislators that the juvenile court was too lenient, that serious offenders were 
beyond rehabilitation and must be incarcerated to ensure public safety, and that juveniles were as 
culpable for their crimes as adults (Redding, 1997). Thus, states passed legal reforms designed to 
Aget tough@ on juvenile crime. The most significant change was states= revision of their transfer 
laws to expand the type of offenses and offenders eligible for transfer from the juvenile court to 
the adult court for trial and sentencing. Changes also occurred at the federal level with the 
passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Pub. L. 103-332, 108 
Stat.1796), which allowed the transfer of 13-year-olds who committed crimes with firearms on 
federal property. Congressman Bill McCollum, a key sponsor of the federal legislation, said that 
A[I]n America today, no population poses a greater threat to public safety than juvenile criminals@
(see Lacayo & Donnelly, 1997, p.26).
This chapter discusses the research on the general and specific deterrent effects of 
transferring juveniles for trial in adult criminal court, identifies gaps in our knowledge base that 
1require further research, discusses the circumstances under which effective deterrence may be 
achieved, and examines whether there are effective alternatives for achieving deterrence other 
than adult sanctions for serious juvenile offenders. As a backdrop to this analysis, this chapter 
first examines the role of public opinion in shaping the “get tough” policies, and how 
policymakers have misunderstood and perceived support for those policies.
The Role of Public Opinion
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the public appeared to support the new approach to 
juvenile crime. Voters passed state propositions allowing more juveniles to be tried as adults 
(Beresford, 2000). Consider California=s Proposition 21, enacted by voter initiative, which 
lowered the age for transfer from 16 to 14 and shifted discretion for making transfer decisions 
from juvenile court judges to prosecutors (Gang Violence & Juvenile Crime Prevention Act, 
2000). The 1993 Gallup Poll showed that 73% of respondents were in favor of trying violent 
juveniles as adults, and influential public officials like Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil 
Garcetti proclaimed, A[w]e need to throw out our entire juvenile justice system@ (see Redding, 
1997, p. 712). Alfred Regnery, Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention in the Reagan administration, argued that juvenile offenders were Agetting away with 
murder,@ that juvenile offenders Aare criminals who happen to be young, not children who happen 
to commit crimes@ (Regnery, 1985, p. 65). 
Perhaps due in part to media hype, much of the public continues to believe that the 
juvenile crime rate remains high (Shepherd, 1999), reflecting an alarmist reaction to crime 
generally (Welch, Fenwick, & Roberts, 1997). But the public is misinformed about the juvenile 
crime problem. Since 1993, the decrease in juvenile crime has been three times greater than the 
decrease in adult crime (Snyder, 2004). Because of this decline, juvenile crime rates are now 
2comparable to what they were in 1980 (Blumstein, 2001), before the policy shift towards 
increased transfer and other punitive responses to juvenile offenders. The juvenile arrest rate for 
violent crime, after peaking in 1994, has now reached its lowest level since 1980 and is 29% 
lower than it was in 1993. There has been a 64% decrease in the number of juveniles arrested for 
murder (Snyder, 2004), likely due to the declining crack cocaine market and tougher anti-
firearms laws and policing programs (Butts & Travis, 2002; Zimring, 1998). 
Despite erroneous public perceptions about juvenile crime rates, however, the public does 
not favor abandoning the rehabilitative ideal of juvenile justice in favor of wholesale punitive 
responses to juvenile offenders. While recent polls show that between 58% to 91% of Americans 
favor (depending on the type of crime and poll) trying violent juvenile offenders as adults 
(Schwartz, Guo, & Kerbs, 1993; The American Enterprise, 2001; Wu, 2000), there is far less 
support for imposing adult sentences (Schwartz et al., 1993). Most still believe in the efficacy of 
the juvenile justice system and want it strengthened, favor early intervention and prevention 
programs along with rehabilitation over punishment for juvenile offenders, would reserve 
incarceration only for the most serious and violent offenders, want juvenile offenders tried as 
adults to receive rehabilitative treatment, and strongly disagree with the confinement of juveniles 
in adult prisons (Moon, Sundt, Cullen, & Wright, 2000; Schiraldi & Soler, 1998). Polls that do 
report high public support for punitive policies typically ask omnibus questions about juvenile 
crime (e.g., asking whether respondents favor Apunishing violent juvenile offenders as adults@). 
More nuanced survey questions that provide respondents with information about particular cases 
or sentencing options (e.g., the background of a particular offender, rehabilitative programs 
available) reveal considerably less support for punitive sentencing policies (see Stalans & Henry, 
1994). While the public favors incarceration for those serious and violent offenders who most 
3threaten public safety, they do not favor the wholesale imprisonment of young, non-violent, or 
first-time offenders (Sundt, 1999). But policymakers consistently overestimate the public=s 
support for punitive policies (Latessa, 2004). 
Legislative Changes in Transfer Laws and Their Impact
ATransfer@ laws (also called Awaiver@ or Acertification@ laws), which transfer juveniles 
from the juvenile court to adult criminal court for trial and sentencing, exist in every state 
(Griffin, 2003; Redding, 1997). During the last twenty years, states revised their transfer laws to 
lower the minimum age for transfer, increase the number of transferable offenses, expand 
prosecutorial discretion while reducing judicial discretion in transfer decision making, and 
expand the reach of laws requiring that certain juvenile offenders be automatically tried as adults 
(Redding, 2003; see Fagan & Zimring, 2000). In 1979, for example, only 14 states had 
Aautomatic@ transfer laws, but by 1995 twenty-one states had such statutes, with 31 states having 
these laws by 2003 (Steiner & Hemmens, 2003). In addition, 13 states have lowered the age at 
which juvenile court jurisdiction ends, to age 15 or 16 (Sanborn, 2003). 
As a result of the legislative changes, the number of youth convicted of felonies in 
criminal courts and incarcerated in adult facilities has increased (Redding, 2003). The number 
reached a peak in the mid-1990's and has declined since (Puzzanchera, 2003), due in part to the 
decrease in juvenile crime. Despite the legislative changes in transfer laws, transfer remains 
relatively uncommon; less than 1% of all juvenile court cases are transferred (Puzzanchera, 
2003). 
According to the most recent data available, an estimated 5,600 youth were committed to 
state adult prisons in 1999, representing 2% of all new prison commitments. These numbers 
reflect a 26% decrease in youth commitments since the peak year of 1995, but nonetheless an 
4overall increase of 70% between 1985 and 2000 (Sickmund, 2004). These youth are 
overwhelmingly male (96%) and most were 17-years-old at the time of their commitment; 36% 
were white and 57% were African American. Sixty-two percent were incarcerated for person 
offenses, 22% for property offenses, 5% for public orders offenses (e.g., weapons possession), 
and 1% for drug offenses (Sickmund, 2004). Seventy-eight percent were released before their 21st
birthday and 95% were released before their 25th birthday, with an average of about 2 years, 8 
months served. 
Prior research (before about 1990) was inconclusive on whether juveniles sentenced in 
adult criminal court received more severe sentences than those sentenced in the juvenile court for 
similar crimes (Kupchik, Fagan, & Liberman, 2003). But several more methodologically 
sophisticated studies confirm that, in recent years, transferred juveniles do receive tougher 
sentences (Kupchik et al, 2003; Kurlychek & Johnson, 2004). Data from some states indicates 
that they may even receive more severe sentences than adults convicted of the same crime 
(Kurlychek & Johnson, 2004; Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 1996). Indeed, 
the nationwide policy shift towards transferring juveniles to the criminal court is based partly on 
the assumption that more punitive, adult sentences will follow, and that these sentences will act 
as a general or specific deterrent to juvenile crime. 
In terms of specific deterrence B i.e., whether trying and sentencing juvenile offenders as 
adults decreases the likelihood that they will recidivate -- seven recent large-scale studies in 
various jurisdictions have all found higher recidivism rates among juveniles convicted for violent 
offenses and sentenced as adults, when compared to similar juvenile offenders tried in the 
juvenile court. On the other hand, it is unclear whether transfer affects recidivism among non-
violent property offenders (Redding, 2003; Redding & Mrozoski, 2005). With respect to general 
5deterrence C i.e., whether transfer laws deter would-be juvenile offenders C the picture is 
considerably less clear, because there are only three systematic empirical studies that have 
produced conflicting findings, and these studies were conducted 15 to 20 years ago (Redding, 
2003; Redding & Mrozoski, 2005). The issues of general and specific deterrence are discussed in 
the following sections.
General Deterrence: Do Transfer Laws Deter and Prevent Juvenile Crime?
Two well-designed studies conducted in the 1980s found that transfer laws did not reduce 
juvenile crime. On the contrary, Jensen and Metsger=s (1994) time-series analysis found a 13% 
increase in arrest rates for violent juvenile crime in Idaho after the state implemented its 
automatic transfer law. In a similar analysis, Singer and McDowall (1988) found that a New 
York state law that automatically sent violent juvenile offenders to criminal court (by lowering 
the age for criminal court jurisdiction) had no deterrent effect, even though the law was widely 
applied and publicized in the media. In addition, brochures were sent to public schools 
announcing the law and the risks juveniles faced, and juvenile court judges warned youth about 
the risks of committing violent offenses (S. Singer, 2004, personal communication). The limited 
evidence available at the time suggested that juveniles in New York were aware of the automatic 
transfer law (Singer & McDowall, 1988).
On the other hand, the results of a multi-state economic analysis for the years 1978 to 
1993, suggests that trying juveniles as adults may have moderate deterrent effects (Levitt, 1998). 
The study found a 25% decrease in violent juvenile crime and a 10-15% decrease in property 
crime committed by juveniles in states that lowered the jurisdictional age for criminal court from 
18 to 17. The greatest decreases in crime were found in states having the greatest disparity in 
punishment severity between the criminal and juvenile courts. These data suggest the deterrent 
6effect of criminal court sanctions. The researcher concluded that A[t]he estimated decrease in 
crime associated with incarcerating an additional juvenile is at least as large as the corresponding 
reduction in crime for adults@ (Levitt, 1998, p. 1181). The same study, however, found no 
relationship between the punitiveness of juvenile court sanctions and later criminal offending in 
adulthood. 
Levitt=s (1998) aggregate analysis of crime rates across states differs substantially from 
the methodology used by Jensen and Metsger (1994) and Singer and McDowall (1988), which 
used careful offender case comparisons and quasi-experimental controls to study crime rates in a 
particular state. In addition, the Levitt study specifically examined the effects of criminal court 
jurisdiction (when youth reached the age of majority), rather than the effects of transfer laws per 
se. Unlike knowing that one could be tried as an adult for crimes committed while a juvenile, 
which most juveniles do not seem to realize (as discussed below), Ait is probably well known that 
dramatically greater penalties for all offenses are imposed once a juvenile reaches the age of 
majority@ (Robinson & Darley, 2004, p. 177). 
Data from some communities also suggest that transfer laws deter juvenile crime. In 
Jacksonville, Florida, the juvenile arrest rate decreased 30% and the juvenile violent crime rate 
decreased 44% between 1993 and 1994, after the local prosecutor instituted aggressive policies 
to prosecute serious juvenile offenders in criminal court (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996).
Only a few studies have interviewed juvenile offenders, however. Before the widespread 
expansion of transfer laws, Glassner, Ksander, Berg, and Johnson (1983) reported the results of 
interviews with a small number of juvenile offenders in New York, who said they had decided to 
stop offending once they reached the age at which they knew they could be tried as adults. A 
recent small-scale study interviewed 37 juvenile offenders who had been transferred to criminal 
7court, for armed robbery or murder, in Georgia. The study examined their knowledge and 
perceptions of transfer laws and criminal sanctions (Redding & Fuller, 2004). Georgia had 
undertaken a public awareness campaign to inform juveniles about the state=s new automatic 
transfer law. Nonetheless, juveniles reported being unaware of the transfer law; only 30% knew 
that juveniles who committed serious crimes could be tried as adults. Even among those who 
knew about the law, none expected that it would be enforced against them for the serious crime 
they committed. On the contrary, many thought they would only get slap on the wrist sentences 
from the juvenile court. These results are consistent with those in a recent Canadian study finding 
that many juvenile offenders did not think that they would receive a serious punishment if caught 
(Peterson-Badali, Ruck, & Koegl, 2001).
How Might Transfer Laws Have Deterrent Effects on Juvenile Crime?
There are likely two explanations for juvenile offenders’ inaccurate perceptions about the 
risk of being tried as adults. First, juveniles’ psychosocial immaturity (see Beckman, 2004; Scott, 
Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996) may make them less likely to 
perceive accurately the likelihood of apprehension and serious punishment. Second, the relatively 
mild sanctions the juveniles had previously received from the juvenile court may have 
communicated the wrong message about the consequences of committing crimes as a juvenile. 
As one juvenile interviewed by Redding and Fuller (2004) explained, A[Being tried as an adult] 
showed me it=s not a game anymore. Before, I thought that since I=m a juvenile I could do just 
about anything and just get six months if I got caught@ (p. 39). The juvenile justice system may 
fail to provide meaningful sanctions until it is too late. AHow is an offender supposed to judge 
which >last chance to go straight= is really his last? He is likely to keep testing the system until it 
lands on him hard . . . . [Thus], every detected nontrivial violation of law ought to lead to some 
8nontrivial deprivation of liberty@ (Kleiman, 1999, p. 13). And as one Los Angeles Assistant 
District Attorney said, AYou talk to youngsters . . . and they tell you, repeatedly, that they got 
away with so much C that they commit crimes, but aren=t arrested, and if they are arrested, when 
they are brought into [juvenile] court, nothing happens@ (see Michaelis, 2001, p. 309).
An initial light sanction by the juvenile court followed by ever-increasing punishment 
severity for subsequent offenses, up to and including criminal sentences, may have 
counterproductive effects. A[J]udges often do not send youthful offenders to prison because the 
experience may increase their future likelihood of committing criminal offenses . . . However, 
from the deterrence perspective, it may bring about the >hardening to punishment= effect observed 
in animals, in which an escalating series of punishments, if it begins at a level that is ineffective 
in controlling the initial transgression, simply conditions the person to tolerate the increasing 
punishments, without reducing the rate of transgressions@ (Robinson & Darley, 2004, p. 187). If 
true, this offers an especially compelling rationale for ensuring that the initial sanctions applied 
by the juvenile court have enough bite. Nonetheless, the studies (e.g., Minor, Hartmann, & Terry, 
1997; Wooldredge, 1988) are mixed on whether the initial actions by the juvenile court 
(diversion vs. adjudication and sentencing) impact recidivism, at least vis-a-vis first-time or 
relatively non-serious offenders. 
The juvenile offenders interviewed by Redding and Fuller (2004) indicated that being 
tried as adults taught them, apparently for the first time, that their criminal behavior had real 
consequences. The challenge would be how to deliver this Awake-up call@ without inflicting the 
Apermanently disfiguring@ (see Zimring, 2000) and counter-rehabilitative effects of the criminal 
justice system. Scared straight programs, shock incarceration programs, and boot camps have all 
proved ineffective in reducing recidivism in juvenile offenders (Finckenauer & Gavin, 1999). But 
9knowing they could be tried and sentenced as adults, juvenile offenders say, may have prevented 
them from committing the crime (Redding & Fuller, 2004). We cannot know whether their 
introspections are accurate. A recent study with serious juvenile offenders found a correlation 
between their self-reported likelihood of committing a future offense and the number of offenses 
they committed after their release (Corrado et al., 2003), mirroring a similar study with adult 
offenders (Burnett, 2000). The Redding & Fuller (2004) study, though conducted on a small 
sample in only one jurisdiction, provides some limited evidence that juvenile offenders may 
calibrate their behavior as a function of the perceived likelihood of receiving an adult 
punishment. 
Some have argued that the recent decline in crime rates is due to Aget tough@ policies (see 
Bennett et al., 1996; Scheidegger & Rushford, 1999). There has been relatively little research on 
deterrence with respect to juveniles, and the results have been mixed, with some studies finding 
deterrence effects for certainty and severity of punishment and others finding no such effects or 
even negative effects (see Corrado et al., 2003). Corrado et al=s (2003) recent study with serious 
juvenile offenders incarcerated in a maximum security facility found a negative relationship 
between intent to re-offend and sentence severity, with evidence that they made Asome explicit 
calculations about the advantages and disadvantages of committing future crimes@ (p. 197). 
Given the paucity of research on juvenile crime deterrence, this chapter turns now to 
research with adults that is relevant to the question of whether we should expect transfer laws to 
deter juvenile crime. A comprehensive analysis of the extant research on criminal deterrence 
conducted in 1998 by the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University concluded: AThe 
studies plainly suggest that when potential offenders are made aware of substantial risks of being 
punished, many of them are induced to desist@ (Von Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney, & Wikstrom, 
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1999, p. 47). The perceived certainty of punishment (e.g., being apprehended and tried as an 
adult) appears to affect crime rates. It is unclear, however, whether the severity of punishment 
(e.g., receiving a substantial adult sentence) affects crime rates, though the limited evidence 
available suggests that it does not. Von Hirsch et al. (1999) speculate that this is because 
potential offenders typically have much more information about certainty of apprehension than 
sentence severity; studies show that offenders and the public generally know little about potential 
sentences and tend to greatly underestimate their severity (Robinson & Darley, 2004; Von Hirsch 
et al., 1999). Moreover, punishment is an uncertain future event that offenders tend to discount 
(whereas the short term rewards of crime are salient), and relatively small or large changes in 
penalties may not be calibrated to offenders= thresholds for offending. At the same time, A[f]uture 
contingent costs may be discounted less, if their magnitude is sufficiently great and their 
likelihood of being incurred increases. Severe sentencing policies thus might possibly have an 
impact if coupled with much higher probabilities of conviction@ (Von Hirsch et al., 1999, p. 48). 
Thus, one might suppose that transfer laws would serve a deterrent function if would-be juvenile 
offenders are made aware of such laws and if the laws are widely implemented, with convictions 
resulting in significant adult sentences. 
But in order for criminal sanctions to have deterrent effects, potential offenders must: (1) 
believe that there is a reasonable likelihood of getting caught, (2) know that the likelihood of a 
conviction and receiving a substantial sentence is significant or has increased, (3) believe that the 
penalty will be applied to them if caught, and (4) consider the risk of the penalty when deciding
whether to offend (see Von Hirsch, 1999). Moreover, the perceived costs of obeying the law 
must outweigh the perceived benefits of offending. Robinson and Darley (2004) argue that, for a 
variety of reasons, such conditions rarely are present in the real world. Youths’ psychosocial 
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immaturity (e.g., impulsivity, risk taking proclivity, short-term time perspective, limited ability to 
foresee future consequences, limited life experience and metacognitive skills) (Beckman, 2004; 
Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996) could make this rational-
choice model of deterrence, which assumes that perceived consequences influence decisions 
about committing crime, less applicable to juvenile offenders (see Schneider & Ervin, 1990). 
Consider, however, each of these necessary preconditions for successful deterrence in the context 
of juvenile offending. A law cannot act as a deterrent if the targeted population is unaware that 
the law exists or does not believe it will be enforced. Recall Redding and Fuller’s (2004) finding 
that few violent juvenile offenders knew they could be tried as adults, none thought it would 
happen to them, and few thought they would face serious punishment. Moreover, few reported 
thinking about the possibility of getting caught when they committed the offense. It seems that 
offenders generally underestimate the risk that they will be caught, thinking instead that they will 
avoid the mistakes that insnarled others (Robinson & Darley, 2004). Juveniles= psychosocial 
immaturity makes it even less likely that they will perceive a significant risk of being convicted 
and sentenced as an adult. 
Substantial further research is urgently needed to examine whether transfer laws have (or 
could have, given the appropriate conditions) the general deterrent effect of preventing juvenile 
crime. In particular, it is important to examine whether juveniles are aware of transfer laws, 
whether this awareness deters delinquent behavior, and whether they believe the laws will be 
enforced against them. In conjunction with such research, there is a need for better designed and 
well-targeted public awareness campaigns on the state and local levels designed to make would-
be juvenile offenders aware of the consequences of serious and violent crime (Redding & Fuller, 
2004), and for rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness. Such campaigns have proved effective 
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in reducing adult crime in some contexts (e.g., Johnson & Bowers, 2003). Unfortunately, 
however, the few public awareness campaigns instituted to inform juveniles about transfer laws 
have been of fairly limited scope and duration and of questionable effectiveness in targeting the 
population at risk (see Redding & Fuller, 2004). 
Specific Deterrence: Do Transfer Laws Decrease Offenders= Recidivism?
Seven large-scale studies indicate that youth tried in adult criminal court for violent 
crimes have greater recidivism rates after release than those tried in juvenile court, though it is 
unclear whether transfer affects recidivism for property offenders. 
Fagan (1996) examined the recidivism rates of 800 randomly selected 15- and 16-year-
old juvenile offenders charged with robbery or burglary. Controlling for eight variables (prior 
offenses, offense severity, race, gender, age at first offense, case length, sentence length, and 
court), this natural experiment compared offenders charged in New Jersey=s juvenile courts with 
offenders charged in New York=s criminal courts under that state=s automatic transfer law. Both 
geographical areas shared similar demographic, socioeconomic, sociolegal, and crime-indictor 
characteristics. Thus, the study provides a direct comparison of recidivism rates as a function of 
whether cases are processed in juvenile or criminal court, without as many of the sample 
selection problems inherent in studies comparing cases within a single jurisdiction where 
prosecutors or judges decide which cases to transfer. Youth who had committed robbery and 
were sentenced in adult criminal court had a higher post-release recidivism rate than those tried 
in juvenile court, but the recidivism rates for burglary offenders tried in criminal and juvenile 
courts were similar. The findings on robbery offenders suggest that criminal court processing, 
irrespective of whether youth are incarcerated in juvenile or adult facilities, produces a higher 
recidivism rate. This finding is emphasized by the parallel finding that youth sentenced to 
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probation in criminal court had a substantially higher recidivism rate than those incarcerated in 
the juvenile justice system (see also Mason & Chang, 2001).
Bishop and colleagues (1996) compared the one-year recidivism rate of 2,738 juvenile 
offenders transferred to criminal court in Florida with a matched sample of 2,738 juvenile 
offenders who had not been transferred. Florida relies almost exclusively on transfer by 
prosecutors, whose transfer decisions are largely offense driven and made soon after arrest, 
before gaining access to information about the youth=s background. Therefore, it is less likely that 
the youth retained in the juvenile justice system had lower recidivism rates due to selection 
factors (Bishop, 2000). Nonetheless, this study cannot completely rule out possible selection 
effects in some (and perhaps a significant number) of cases. The study, which controlled for
seven variables (race, gender, age, most serious prior offense, number of referrals to juvenile 
court, number of charges, and most serious charge), found that the re-arrest rates were higher (30 
versus 19 percent) and the time to re-offending shorter (135 versus 227 days) for the transferred 
youth across seven offense types (ranging from violent felonies to minor misdemeanors). 
Following the same Florida offenders six years after this initial study, Winner and colleagues 
(1997) also found higher recidivism rates among those transferred to criminal courts, with the 
exception of property felons. 
Controlling for demographic and offense-related variables (e.g., age of onset of offending, 
prior offenses, use of a firearm), Myers (2001) examined the recidivism rates of 557 violent 
juvenile offenders in Pennsylvania. Youth who were judicially transferred to criminal court were 
rearrested more quickly upon their return to the community than youth who were retained in 
juvenile justice system during the same period. However, transferred youth who were 
incarcerated for longer periods had a lower recidivism rate upon release than those incarcerated 
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for shorter periods. Similarly, Podkopacz and Feld (1996) compared transferred with non-
transferred juvenile offenders in Minnesota, and found higher recidivism rates among those 
transferred.
These five studies involving all three types of transfer laws (automatic, judicial, and 
prosecutorial) used fairly large sample sizes (557 to 5,476), different methodologies (natural 
experiment and matched groups), and were conducted in five different jurisdictions (Florida, 
New Jersey, New York, Minnesota, Pennsylvania). Yet they each had significant methodological 
limitations, primarily the inability to control completely for possible differential selection effects 
(vis-à- vis juveniles= amenability to treatment and recidivism risk) between those cases retained in 
the juvenile court versus those that were transferred.
But armed with two very recent large-scale studies that better control for possible 
selection effects, we can now conclude with much greater confidence that transfer generally does 
increase recidivism, though remaining methodological limitations still do not allow for definitive 
conclusions. Fagan, Kupchik and Liberman=s (2003) recent finding of greater recidivism for 
transferred juveniles (charged with robbery, burglary, or assault) replicates Fagan=s (1996) 
previous study but with a larger data set (2,400 juveniles) and methodology that better controls 
for important variables relating to possible selection effects. As in the previous study, by 
controlling for sentence lengths, the study showed that criminal court processing per se (rather 
than differential sentences between the juvenile and criminal courts) increased recidivism. 
Similarly, Lanza-Kaduce, Frazier, Lane, and Bishop=s (2000) recent follow-up study to the 
Bishop et al. (1996) Florida recidivism study also replicated the previous findings of higher 
recidivism rates for transferred juveniles as a function of criminal court processing per se (rather 
than differential sentences), using better matching techniques to control for possible selection 
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effects, more extensive recidivism data, and data drawn from six Florida judicial circuits in rural 
and urban jurisdictions.
Why Do Juveniles Tried as Adults Have Higher Recidivism Rates?
What explains the higher recidivism rates for violent juvenile offenders tried in criminal 
court? The stigmatization and other negative effects of labeling juveniles as convicted felons, the 
sense of resentment and injustice juveniles feel about being tried as adults, the decreased focus 
on rehabilitation and family support in the adult system, and the learning of criminal mores and 
behavior from adult criminals have all been singled out as possible reasons for the increased 
recidivism (see Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995; Thomas & Bishop, 1984; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, 
Bishop, & Frazier, 1997). Moreover, a felony conviction also usually results in the loss of a 
number of civil rights and privileges (see Redding, 2003), further reducing the opportunities for 
employment and community reintegration.
Juveniles’ sense of injustice at criminal court processing may cause them to react 
defiantly through re-offending and only harden their concept of themselves as Acriminals@ (see 
Thomas & Bishop, 1984; Winner et al., 1997). AThe concept of fairness appears to be an 
important variable in an individual=s perception of sentence severity and its subsequent 
relationship to future recidivism@ (Corrado et al., 2003, p. 183). And, conduct-disordered 
adolescents, it seems, already have a strong sense of having been dealt an unfair hand by 
authority figures (Chamberlain, 1998). Bishop and Frazier (2000) interviewed 95 serious and 
chronic juvenile offenders in Florida who had been transferred to the criminal justice system and 
incarcerated in correctional facilities. Many of the juveniles felt a strong sense of injustice and 
resentment about being tried as adults:
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Many experience the court process not so much as a condemnation of their 
behavior as a condemnation of them. Unlike the juvenile court, the criminal court 
failed to communicate that young offenders retain some fundamental worth. What 
the youths generally heard was that they were being punished not only because 
their behavior was bad but also because they were personifications of their 
behavior. Far from viewing the criminal court and its officers as legitimate, the 
juvenile offenders we interviewed saw them more often as duplicitous and 
manipulative, malevolent in intent, and indifferent to their needs. It was common 
for them to experience a sense of injustice and, then, to condemn the condemners. 
(Bishop & Frazier, 2000, p. 263).
These findings are consistent with those of Redding and Fuller (2004) who found that juveniles 
tried as adults clearly did not perceive transfer laws as being fair and just. Many felt that their 
juvenile status and immaturity dictated that they should be tried as juveniles, despite the serious 
crime they committed. They also did not understand what the law was attempting to accomplish 
by trying them as adults and felt that they were somehow being treated differently than other 
similarly-situated juveniles. Both perceptions contributed to their sense of unfairness. 
An especially compelling explanation for the increased recidivism is the greatly reduced 
opportunities for meaningful rehabilitation in the criminal justice system and the hardening of 
youth who serve time in adult prisons. Bishop and Frazier=s (2000) recent study vividly portrays 
the differences between juvenile and adult correctional facilities. ADespite the punitive rhetoric@
of juvenile justice in Florida (alongside Texas, the state having the highest per capita number of 
juveniles tried in criminal court), they found that the juvenile correctional institutions were 
treatment oriented and adhered to therapeutic models of rehabilitation (Bishop & Frazier, 2000, 
17
p. 255). Juveniles in these facilities had positive feelings about the staff, whom they felt cared 
about them and taught them appropriate behaviors. In contrast, Florida prisons were clearly 
custodial in nature (see Annino, 2000), and the juveniles in adult prisons reported that much of 
their time was spent learning criminal behavior from the inmates and responding to pressure to 
prove how tough they were. They also were much more fearful of being victimized than they had 
been in juvenile facilities; more than 30% had been assaulted or had witnessed assaults by prison 
staff. Notably, most of the juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities felt confident that they 
would not reoffend after release, often crediting the staff with helping them make this positive 
change. But only a third of the juveniles in adult prisons said that they would not reoffend. In 
sum, Acompared to the criminal justice system, the juvenile system seems to be more 
reintegrative in practice and effect@ (Bishop & Frazier, 2000, p. 265). This is well described by 
Forst, Fagan, and Vivona’s (1989) study, which found that unlike adult prisons, counseling in 
juvenile facilities was provided by line staff as part of their regular duties. Youth in juvenile 
facilities gave higher marks than youth in adult facilities to the available treatment and case 
management services, which youth in detention described as helpful in providing counseling, 
obtaining needed services, encouraging participation in programs, teaching the consequences of 
rule-breaking, and deepening their understanding of their problems.
Adult prisons are unlikely to provide an environment conducive to rehabilitation, for 
either adult or juvenile offenders. A prisoner=s experience is Afrom the outset, an experience of 
being violently dominated, and it is colored from the beginning by the fear of being violently 
treated@ (Cover, 1986, p. 1608). Force, intimidation, and threat from prison gangs are the norm, 
as are overcrowded and starkly inadequate living conditions and the significant physical and 
psychological stresses of prison life. As one federal court explained, modern prison life Amay 
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press the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate@ (Madrid v. Gomez, 
1995, p. 1267). Beyer (1997) paints a bleak picture of life in adult prison for juveniles, who are at 
greater risk for suicide and physical and sexual abuse from older inmates. As compared with 
juvenile facilities, juveniles incarcerated in adult prison are eight times more likely to commit 
suicide, five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, and almost twice as likely to be attacked 
with a weapon by inmates and beaten by staff (Beyer, 1997). One study found that 10% of youth 
held in adult prisons reported being raped or sexually assaulted, ten times higher than the rate in 
juvenile facilities (Ziedenberg & Schiraldi, 1997). Because juveniles in adult prisons are exposed 
to a criminal culture in which inmates commit crimes against each other, these institutions may 
socialize delinquent juveniles into true career criminals. Violent juvenile offenders who were 
interviewed in an older study about their life in prison (Eisikovits & Baizerman, 1983) reported 
that their daily survival required finding ways to fit into the inmate culture, dealing with difficult 
and authoritarian relationships with adult inmates, and adjusting to the institution by accepting 
violence as a part of daily life and, thus, becoming even more violent. 
Redding and Fuller (2004) found that juveniles whose jail or prison experiences were 
worse than they had expected, and those who reported witnessing or experiencing violence while 
incarcerated, were less likely to say that their incarceration would deter them from committing 
crimes in the future. This finding raises the possibility that incarceration in adult facilities may 
have brutalizing effects on juveniles, which may partly account for the increased recidivism 
among juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities. The term Abrutalization effect@ describes the 
finding that homicide rates in a state often increase after an execution (Bowers, 1998), perhaps 
because executions model and communicate that violence is an acceptable and psychologically 
cathartic alternative. Likewise, juveniles’ brutal experiences in adult prison may teach the wrong 
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lessons about the acceptability and psychological benefits of criminal conduct, particularly 
violent crime, while also contributing to their sense of being treated unfairly. Further research is 
needed on this important issue.
Psychological research and theory on the effects of punishment also suggest that harsher 
punishments for serious juvenile offenders, in the form of lengthy sentences in adult prisons, may 
have counter-deterrence effects. In what will surely become an important contribution to the 
deterrence literature, Robinson and Darley (2004) offer an intriguing analysis of the 
psychological literature on punishment, to suggest that lengthier prison sentences may have less 
of a specific deterrence effect than shorter sentences. Offenders gradually become desensitized to 
incarceration, which loses much of its initial aversive bite by the end of the lengthy prison term. 
Thus, a shorter sentence Awill be experienced as much more aversive than a much longer 
sentence that is equally aversive at the beginning but less so at the end”. The experience of the 
incarceration just before the offender is released is what matters most psychologically when the 
offender subsequently calculates whether to reoffend (Robinson & Darley, 2004, p.190). 
Moreover, because time passes much slower for juveniles than for adults, a juvenile will 
experience a prison term as lasting much longer, in psychological terms, than will an adult.
With increasing numbers of juveniles being incarcerated in adult facilities, research is 
urgently needed on the effects of such incarceration on juveniles= psychological and behavioral 
functioning and on effective, developmentally appropriate programming for juveniles in these 
facilities (Redding, 2003). Perhaps the most important challenge for future research is to 
determine what features of criminal court processing increase recidivism, an important question 
for policymaking. For example, are there changes that could be made in the criminal court 
processing of juveniles to make it less detrimental? In what ways should the juvenile justice 
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system be on guard against those features of the criminal justice system that serve to increase 
recidivism? How can states= blended sentencing systems, which allow the juvenile courts to 
impose adult sentences in certain cases (see Redding & Howell, 2000), incorporate the best 
features of both the juvenile and criminal justice systems while avoiding the iatrogenic effects of 
criminal justice system processing?
Implications for Legal Policy and Practice
Effective Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders
It is important that the juvenile court=s response to first-time juvenile offenders be 
calibrated so as to have sufficient bite while not being overly punitive. However, most juvenile 
offenders B even serious and violent offenders B do not require punitive punishments like trial 
and sentencing in the criminal court, which may instead have the unintended effect of delaying 
desistence from crime and promoting life-course criminality (Scott, 2000). Yet in Florida, for 
example, 43% of the 1100 juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons for offenses committed when 
they were 15 years old or younger had not previously been committed to a juvenile justice 
program (Annino, 2000). Thus, the juvenile justice system was never given a chance to 
rehabilitate these youth before they were transferred to the adult system. Consider also that many 
of these youth were accomplices (and not the primary perpetrator) to violent offenses committed 
by older juveniles or they intended to commit a property crime but unintentionally committed a 
violent crime (Annino, 2000). 
Florida is not unique in transferring first-time serious offenders to the criminal court. 
Transfer laws, particularly automatic transfer laws, target these offenders even though they do 
not pose the greatest recidivism risk or threat to community safety (Bishop, 2004; Redding, 
1997). First-time offenders typically do not re-offend -- Athe probability of violence following 
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violence is especially rare@ (Bishop, 2004, p. 637). Rather, it is the chronicity of offending 
instead of the seriousness of the first offense that predicts recidivism and the offender’s risk for 
committing another violent offense (see Bishop, 2004; Piquero, 2000; Redding, 1997, citing 
research studies). Thus, transfer should be based primarily on the offender=s characteristics and 
offending history, not the seriousness of the charged offense. (First-time offenders who commit 
particularly serious or violent crimes may, however, warrant transfer on retributive grounds). 
Transfer should be discretionary, rather than automatic, with transfer decisions made by juvenile 
court judges based on statutory guidelines that direct the court to consider factors relating to the 
offender=s psychosocial maturity, competence to stand trial in the criminal court, potential for 
rehabilitation, and recidivism risk (see Redding, 1997). 
A small number of repeat offenders (about 8 - 10%) are responsible for most of the 
serious or violent offenses (between 60% - 80%) committed by juveniles, and are the offenders 
most likely to become the Acareer criminals@ (Loeber, Farrington & Waschbusch, 1998). The 
juveniles at risk for becoming chronic offenders can be reliably identified upon their first contact 
with the juvenile justice system because they have a unique constellation of risk factors that 
includes criminal involvement at a very early age and typically family problems, problems in 
school, substance abuse, and gang involvement or running away from home (Schumacher & 
Kurz, 1999). Orange County, California implemented a comprehensive early intervention 
program B called “the 8% solution” B for the 8-10% of offenders who are responsible for most of 
the serious juvenile crime, when they first come into contact with the juvenile justice system. The 
program provides an array of services that target the individual, family, school, and peer group 
risk factors that contribute to their offending. Initial evaluations have shown promising results in 
reducing recidivism (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). An important agenda item for future 
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research is the development of standardized risk assessment and classification instruments (such 
as the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth [SAVRY]; Borum, Barte & Forth, 
2002), that could be used to help to identify those few youth who should be transferred due to 
their high recidivism risk and relatively low rehabilitative potential. Unfortunately, however, a 
small percentage of offenders will require criminal sanctions. Since juvenile sanctions cannot be 
imposed past the age of 21, a criminal sentence is needed in some cases to ensure community 
safety, and this is the overriding reason for transfer (Redding, 1997). Such sentences may be 
achieved through transfer, or through the blended sentencing options now available in many 
states, which allow juvenile courts to impose limited adult sentences (see Redding & Howell, 
2000). 
The Role for Advocacy
There is no out-of-control juvenile crime problem, an informed public does not support 
the widespread adjudication and sentencing of (even) serious and violent juvenile offenders as 
adults, the public still supports the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, and research 
does not support the efficacy of punitive juvenile justice policies. Convincing policymakers of 
these realities will require vigorous and sustained efforts by juvenile justice researchers and 
advocates. Importantly, policymakers must be persuaded that less punitive, rehabilitative 
responses to juvenile crime yield measurable benefits in terms of reduced crime and recidivism 
rates, and/or reduced justice system costs (Latessa, 2004). As a leading criminological researcher 
and advocate says, AI have found very few policy makers unwilling to at least listen to the 
empirical research when you frame it within the context of public protection@ (Latessa, 2004, p. 
549). Our knowledge about the Acauses@ (risk factors) of delinquency is strong, the effectiveness 
of evidence-based juvenile prevention and rehabilitative programs has been clearly demonstrated 
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in rigorous evaluations, and evidence continues to mount on the counter-rehabilitative effects of 
adult sanctions (see Redding, Goldstein, & Heilbrun, 2005).
Indeed, sometimes policymakers respond. For example, following hearings in 2003 on 
evidence-based correctional programs, the Oregon legislature passed legislation requiring that 
75% of the spending of the Youth Authority and Commission on Children and Families be 
allocated to evidence-based programs by the year 2009 (Latessa, 2004)! In Florida, which has 
had some of the most punitive juvenile justice policies in the nation, the number of juveniles 
transferred decreased by two-thirds between 1996 and 2003 (while the total number of juvenile 
court cases decreased by only 9%), apparently due to research disseminated to policymakers 
showing the counter-deterrent effects of transfer (Bishop, 2004). In addition, Florida has 
undertaken vigorous efforts to promote and institute evidence-based programming (Latessa, 
2004) and expanded the number of placements within the juvenile justice system for serious 
offenders (Bishop, 2004). In the last several years, some states have even reduced the scope of 
transfer laws to make fewer juvenile offenders eligible for discretionary transfer (Bishop, 2004; 
Griffin, 2003).
But at other times it can be a hard sell. When it comes to crime control, Aeveryone is an 
expert@ (Latessa, 2004, p. 551) with a strong intuitive sense of what works (e.g., tougher laws and 
punishment), even though their intuitions often run contrary to the findings of empirical research. 
In my experience working with juvenile justice policymakers and practitioners, I have found that 
they are fairly impressed by results from treatment programs such as Multisystemic Therapy 
(MST) showing sizeable reductions in recidivism for serious and violent juvenile offenders 
(Henggeler et al., 1998), and by research showing the superior effectiveness of community-based 
treatment (Sheidow & Henggeler, 2005). It also is not difficult to persuade policymakers that 
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incarcerating juveniles in adult prisons will fail to rehabilitate.
Yet many policymakers still favor transfer laws on the theory that they will deter 
juveniles from committing crime in the first place or that such laws enhance public safety in the 
near-term by incapacitating, through lengthier adult sentences, serious juvenile offenders. Many 
also are unpersuaded by studies showing the counter-deterrent effects of transfer, because of the 
studies’ inherent methodological limitations (i.e., the inability to fully control for selection 
effects) and the somewhat counterintuitive nature of the findings (i.e., that tougher penalties have 
no deterrent effect). In addition, some policymakers are skeptical of research by social scientists, 
perceiving it to be shaped by a liberal political mindset (see Redding, 2001) that is overly 
sympathetic to offenders. For example, in an analysis of the New York State legislature’s debate 
on the death penalty during the years 1977 to 1995, Galliher and Galliher (2002) show how many 
legislators were unpersuaded by the social science research on deterrence because they relied 
instead on their own commonsense assumptions, distrusted statistical analysis or social science, 
or distrusted the social scientists. Consider the following statements made by state senators 
during the floor debates:
“It simply defies all common sense and all my knowledge of human nature to argue that a 
penalty of death does not act as a deterrent.” (p.328). 
“These studies basically are the work of criminologists or social scientists; and why they 
are called scientists, I don’t know.”
“Almost all of the death penalty studies were done by people who started out opposing 
the death penalty and wanted in effect to find out how to oppose it through the deterrence 
argument.”
It is a mistake, for example, to argue that transfer is never appropriate or that punishment 
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is inconsistent with rehabilitation. Those who so advocate loose their credibility with 
policymakers and the public, who will never accept such propositions because of Athe punitive 
necessity of transfer@ (Zimring, 2000). A small number of chronic, juvenile offenders who have 
not responded to previous extensive efforts at rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system do 
warrant criminal sanctions.
Attorneys who represent juvenile offenders at risk for transfer also play a critical role. 
Good legal advocacy is one of the most practical and effective ways to improve the quality of 
justice and programming afforded to youthful offenders. Lawyers and juvenile justice 
professionals must be trained on the relevant juvenile mental health and forensic issues, and, 
most importantly, on the rehabilitative options available or potentially available. In arguing 
against transfer, lawyers must be equipped to provide the court with specific and detailed 
recommendations for effective dispositional alternatives that will ensure community safety while
providing meaningful rehabilitation. Because juvenile court transfer recommendations may be 
influenced by the local availability of treatment options (see Mulvey & Reppucci, 1988), the 
emphasis should be on whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation and what kinds of 
programs could rehabilitate the youth, not whether the juvenile is amenable given locally 
available resources. AA finding of amenability places some pressure on the courts to provide 
adequate treatment to youth who are amenable to treatment@ (Salekin, 2002, p. 67). Similarly, 
Shridharan et al. (2004) recommend that states require that localities have in place certain 
services before implementing a statewide transfer law. 
On a system-wide level, it is important to educate local prosecutors and juvenile court 
judges about the counter-deterrent and counter-rehabilitative effects of transfer and about the 
effectiveness of community-based rehabilitation programs. There is evidence that programs 
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aimed at educating judges and other juvenile justice professionals can have substantial positive 
effects in reducing the number of juveniles receiving adult sanctions. The Miami-Dade County 
Public Defender=s Office developed the Juvenile Sentencing Advocacy Project (JSAP), a highly 
effective program that has produced a 350% increase the number of transferred cases receiving a 
juvenile (rather than an adult) sanction (Mason, 2000). 
Conclusion
The juvenile justice system was created over one hundred years ago Ato save young 
people from the savagery of the criminal courts and prisons,@ by removing juveniles from the 
criminogenic influences of the criminal justice system while providing rehabilitative 
interventions (Zimring, 2000a, p. 2480). It appears that the founders of the juvenile court largely 
got it right. The available evidence, while not definitive, strongly suggests that transferring 
juveniles to the criminal court increases the recidivism rate. Moreover, although transfer has 
produced the intended effect of imposing lengthier sentences on serious juvenile offenders, the 
psychological literature on punishment suggests that shorter sentences may actually be 
experienced as more punitive (and thus, be a greater deterrent) than longer sentences. 
Policymakers must weigh the relatively short-term benefits of incapacitation resulting from 
transfer and imprisonment, against the long-term costs of criminal justice system processing in 
terms of increased recidivism, which in turn, would contribute to increased crime rates. If, 
however, transfer laws deter juvenile crime, then some of these offenders would not have 
offended in the first place. But based on current theorizing and the limited empirical research 
available, the weight of the evidence suggests that transfer laws, at least as currently 
implemented, likely have minimal general deterrent effects.
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Thus, we can tentatively conclude that trying and sentencing juveniles as adults does not 
further the penal goals for which it was intended, particularly the goal of specific deterrence. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, most juvenile offenders are probably not deserving of adult 
punishment. As recently acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons (2005), 
which held that the death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional, the limited life experience and 
psychosocial and brain immaturity of juveniles—particularly of juvenile offenders (see Redding, 
1997)—lessens their culpability.  Punishment that is proportional to the offender’s culpability is 
at the heart of the criminal justice system.
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